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THE BROMBERG BALANCE: PROPER
PORTFOLIO-MONITORING AGREEMENTS
IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
Michael J. Kaufman* and John M. Wunderlich**
I. INTRODUCTION
ROFESSOR Alan Bromberg was a giant in many fields, including
securities-fraud regulation and litigation. Throughout his remarka-
ble work, he struck just the right balance between the goal of
preventing and remedying fraud and the goal of facilitating value-maxi-
mizing securities transactions unfettered by the cost of frivolous litiga-
tion. In particular, he brilliantly led Congress and the Supreme Court in
their efforts to "curb frivolous, lawyer driven litigation, while preserving
investors' ability to recover on meritorious claims."'
In this essay, we try our best to honor Professor Bromberg's legacy by
bringing a balanced approach to an issue at the fore of securities litiga-
tion: the use by plaintiffs' law firms of portfolio-monitoring agreements
with institutional investors, specifically large pension funds. These agree-
ments can foster investor protection by incentivizing law firms and insti-
tutional investors to discover and remedy fraud. Critics, however,
contend that law firms' monitoring arrangements do not actually make
any contribution to the fund itself-they instead facilitate lawyer-driven
frivolous lawsuits, and they can compromise a fund's ability to adequately
and typically represent a class of investors.
In crafting a "Brombergian" balance, this article shows that the bene-
fits of portfolio-monitoring agreements can be attained without the costs
as long as they have two essential components: the arrangement is not
exclusive and the institution retains its independence when it decides
whether to sue and who to retain if it does.
* Professor of Law and the Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at Loyola Univer-
sity Chicago School of Law.
** Institute Scholar for the Institute for Investor Protection at Loyola University Chi-
cago School of Law.
1. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313-14 (2007).
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II. PORTFOLIO-MONITORING AGREEMENTS,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, AND SECURITIES
CLASS ACTIONS
A. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS' PREFERRED STATUS IN SECURITIES
CLASS ACTIONS
Securities-fraud cases usually are prosecuted as representative, class ac-
tion suits.2 The defining characteristic of every class action, including se-
curities class actions, is representation, allowing one person (or group) to
represent and protect the interests of the whole class. 3 To represent a
class, the purported proxy must adequately represent those investors and
have a claim that is typical of the group.4 To adequately represent the
class's interests, the representative must not have interests that conflict
with those of the class and must possess at least a minimal understanding
of the case and the responsibilities that come with the lead spot.5 The
representative must also have a claim that is typical of the class. 6 These
two requirements-typicality and adequacy-ensure that the representa-
tive will pursue class members' claims with sufficient loyalty, effort, and
ability.7
Generally, institutional investors are the preferred representatives in
securities class actions. Institutional investors, which pool and invest
money from the institution's constituents, dominate the trading markets.8
They are usually long-term, sophisticated shareholders and thus more
likely to balance the desire for financial recovery with the need to pre-
vent undue harm to defendant companies. 9 In addition, institutional in-
vestors are more likely to know about the legal process and be discerning
consumers of legal services, which means they are also more likely to
retain the most capable counsel and properly supervise the case. 10 Fi-
nally, institutional investors are likely to have substantial financial stakes
2. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (observing that se-
curities cases "readily" satisfy class-action prerequisites).
3. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (allowing one or more members of a class to sue as
representatives for all members when certain conditions are met); Am. Pipe & Constr. Co.
v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974) ("A federal class action is ... truly [a] representative
suit."); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 223 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) ("In the context of a
securities class action, only one entity is entitled to speak for the class, the lead plaintiff").
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)-(4).
5. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, NEWBERG ON CLASS AcnONS § 3:32 (5th ed.
2013).
6. See, e.g., Hevesi v. Citigroup, Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 82 (2d Cir. 2004).
7. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:32 (5th ed.
2013).
8. See, e.g., John C. Bogle, former Chief Executive, Vanguard Group, Restoring Faith
in Financial Markets: It is Time Institutional Investors Exerted Control Over Publicly Held
Companies, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 18, 2010) (stating that in the mid-1950s, institu-
tional investors held less than 10% of U.S. stocks, but by 2010, these investors controlled
almost 70% of the shares of U.S. companies).
9. See, e.g., Jonathan N. Eisenberg, LITIGATION SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS § 1.02[ii]
(2014).
10. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Governing Securities Class Actions, 80 U.
CIN. L. REV. 299, 309 (2011).
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in the case's outcome and thus are further encouraged to play an active
role in directing the conduct of the litigation."
The preference for institutional investors is by congressional design. 12
In 1995, Congress heard testimony that securities class actions were lawy-
erly-led, frivolous affairs, which entailed attorneys racing to the court-
house to file suit after a company announced bad news that tanked the
stock, followed by abusive "fishing expeditions," rather than legitimate
discovery. 13 Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act to ensure that the representative who was "most capable of ade-
quately representing the interests of the class" would step forward' 4 and,
encouraged institutional investors to take the lead.'5 In light of Con-
gress's preference for institutional investors, the federal courts likewise
have favored institutional investors to lead these cases. 16 Several studies
have found that the presence of institutional investors, such as public and
labor pension funds, in the lead spot correlates with positive outcomes for
investors, including higher recoveries, lower attorneys' fees, and greater
board independence.' 7
11. See, e.g., Jonathan N. Eisenberg, LITIGATION SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS § 1.02[ii]
(2014).
12. Elliott J. Weiss and John S. Beckerman argued that institutional investors with
significant financial interests would be best suited to monitor counsel in securities class
actions. See Let the Money do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce
Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995). Their article is
credited with Congress's procedural changes to securities class actions that encourage insti-
tutional investors' involvement.
13. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4-5, 7-9, 14 (1995), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683-84, 686-88, 693; H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31, 37 (1995) (Conf.
Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i)-(iii). The PSLRA does not require the representa-
tive to be the "most adequate," but instead makes changes to the selection process to
encourage courts to select the most adequate representative. See, e.g., Berger v. Compaq
Computer Corp. (Berger II), 279 F.3d 313, 313-14 (5th Cir. 2002); In re Cavanaugh, 206
F.3d 726, 738-39 (9th Cir. 2002). The PSLRA also made a host of other procedural and
substantive changes to the lOb-5 class action to "combat perceived abuses in the securities
litigation process and particularly to curb frivolous strike suits, coercive settlements, and
excessive legal fees which have become prevalent throughout this process." Lewis D. Low-
enfels & Alan R. Bromberg, A New Standard for Aiders and Abettors Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 52 Bus. LAW. 1 (1996).
15. See, e.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 34 (1995), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 733 ("[I]ncreasing the role of institutional investors in class actions will
ultimately benefit shareholders and assist courts by improving the quality of representation
in securities class actions."); S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 10-11 (1995), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 ("The Committee intends to increase the likelihood that institu-
tional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs by requiring the court to presume that the mem-
ber of the purported class with the largest financial stake in the relief sought is the 'most
adequate plaintiff."').
16. See, e.g., In re Gentiva Sec. Litig., 281 F.R.D. 108, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("[M]any
courts have demonstrated a clear preference for institutional investors to be appointed as
lead plaintiffs.").
17. C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation,
95 J. FIN. & ECON. 356, 362, 374, 377, 380-81 (2010) (finding that securities class actions
with an institutional lead plaintiff, especially a public pension fund, are less likely to be
dismissed, settle for more money, and achieve greater board independence); Stephen J.
Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 900-01 (2005) (finding that securi-
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B. THE USE OF PORTFOLIO MONITORING TO COURT INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS
Because of the preferred status afforded institutional investors, plain-
tiffs' law firms have aimed to develop relationships with public and labor
pension funds and have encouraged them to serve as lead plaintiffs. 18
One way plaintiffs' firms woo these funds is by offering free "portfolio
monitoring" or "securities litigation services." 19 The fund provides infor-
mation on its stock holdings to the law firm, and, in exchange, the firm
monitors the fund's investments in order to alert the fund to potential
claims premised upon violations of the securities laws or breach of fiduci-
ary duty. The firm offers advice on a variety of litigation tactics and strat-
egies, including whether to file an initial suit, to seek the lead in a
pending one, to opt out of an existing or potential class and proceed solo,
or to submit a proof of claim in a settlement. 20 Typically, the monitoring
agreement does not function as a retainer agreement or an agreement to
initiate specific litigation. 21 Once the firm alerts the fund to a potential
claim, the monitoring agreement usually does not obligate the fund to
pursue the action, and should the fund choose to do so, the agreement
usually does not require it to retain any particular firm.
Critics contend that these monitoring arrangements do not actually
make any contribution to the pension fund itself.22 But proponents re-
ties class actions with public pension funds as lead plaintiffs correlate with higher recov-
eries); James D. Cox et al., There are Plaintiffs and ... There are Plaintiffs: An Empirical
Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 367 (2008) (finding
same for labor and public pension funds); Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block:
Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 705-10
(2002) (finding that after the PSLRA, institutional investors, such as pension funds, en-
gaged in a sophisticated evaluation of counsel, sent requests for proposals, and fielded
inquiries from law firms); Michael Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An
Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 368, 369 (2012) (finding that public pension funds as lead plain-
tiff in securities class actions recover more and pay less in attorneys' fees); see also David
H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of In-
stitutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions, 38 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 907, 979-80 (2014) (Institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in deal litigation correlates
with an increase from the offer to the final price, and lower attorneys' fees).
18. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV.
1109, 1121 (2011).
19. See, e.g., Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Confidential Informants and Securities Class
Actions: Mixed Messages and Motives, 45 Loy. U. CHICAGO L. REV. 571, 571 (2014);
Burch, supra note 10, at 301; Burch, supra note 18, at 1121.
20. See, e.g., KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, Monitoring Your Portfolio, http://
ktmc.com/investorsportfolio.php; MOTLEY RICE, Portfolio Monitoring Service, http://
www.motleyrice.com/securities-and-consumer-fraud/portfolio-monitoring-service; ROB-
BINS GELLER RUDMAN & DowD LLP, What Services Do I Receive?, http://
www.rgrdlaw.com/services-portfolio-monitoring-services.html; Wolf Haldenstein, Institu-
tional Investors Overview, http://www.whafh.com/practice-areas/institutional-investors/over
view/.
21. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Chesapeake Energy
Corp., 281 F.R.D. 641, 649-50 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
22. Edward Siedle, Class Action Law Firms Invade Public Pensions, Speech before




spond that monitoring arrangements do uncover at least some corporate
fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty. In fact, although plaintiffs' firms do
not discover the majority of fraudulent activity, they do uncover some.23
Moreover, even if the fund does not choose to file suit or vie for the lead-
plaintiff role, these funds "have available to them a rich array of flexible,
informal, and relatively inexpensive mechanisms by which they can make
their views known to litigants and courts alike."' 24 In other words, moni-
toring services may result in the fund taking action other than litigation.
In addition, proponents of portfolio-monitoring agreements contend
that law firms are uniquely positioned to provide valuable services re-
lated to the detection of fraud and breaches of fiduciary duties. Pension
funds typically own hundreds or thousands of securities, often traded and
managed by external money managers. Money managers may be reluc-
tant to identify any losses at all-let alone ones related to fraud or a
breach of fiduciary duty-because managers likely do not want to call
attention to poor performance or because they view whether a loss is
caused by fraud as a legal call that they are unfit to make.
25
Portfolio-monitoring arrangements may also help pension funds com-
ply with their fiduciary obligations. 26 Pension funds often stand in fiduci-
ary relationships with others, like pension beneficiaries. 27 These
institutional investors may be obligated to watch their investments for
losses caused by fraud or breach of fiduciary duty and ensure that they do
not leave money on the table by missing potential class recoveries.
28
public-pensions/5/. Critics also suggest that portfolio monitoring while not per se problem-
atic, breeds other questionable practices, such as pay-to-play arrangements. Id. But empiri-
cal data to date "suggests that pay-to-play is a less significant driver of public pension fund
participation than is widely believed, and is less important than forces related to benefici-
ary influence over public pension funds." David H. Webber, Is 'Pay-to-Play' Driving Public
Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV.
2031, 2032-33, 2035 (2010). Moreover, if there is, in fact, evidence of a pay-to-play rela-
tionship, this alone is likely sufficient to kick the plaintiff from the lead position. In re
Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[Pay-to-play arrangements
constitute] strong (and, quite probably, dispositive) evidence that the presumption [of ade-
quacy] had been rebutted"); see also In re AT&T Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 168 (3d Cir. 2006)
(stating that pay-to-play arrangements are "problematic"); In re Diamond Foods, Inc. Sec.
Litig.. 295 F.R.D. 240, 255-57 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (refusing to disqualify lead plaintiff amid
pay-to-play allegations but only because there was no evidence of quid pro quo).
23. I.J. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN.
2213 (2010); Dyck et al., supra, at 2225 tbl.2.
24. Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of
Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 ARZ. L. REV. 559, 561 (1996).
25. Sara Hansard, Attorneys Question Portfolio-Monitoring Services, INVEST-
MENTNEwS, http://www.investmentnews.com/article/2006120 4 /SUB/ 61204 070 2 (Dec. 4,
2006) (quoting Douglas McKeige, of counsel to Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann
LLP).
26. See, e.g., Berman Devalerio, Best Practice: Hire More Than One Monitoring Firm,
http://www.bermandevalerio.com/newsfeed/100-best-practice-hire-more-than-one-monitor-
ing-firm; MOTLEY RICE, supra note 20; POMERANTZ LLP, Portfolio Monitoring, http://
pomerantzlawfirm.com/?page-id=14; ROBBINs GELLER, supra note 20.
27. Hansard, supra note 25.
28. Shortly after the PSLRA, the Secretary of Labor (charged with interpreting and
enforcing ERISA) filed an amicus brief supporting the Florida State Board of Administra-
tion's effort to be appointed as lead plaintiff in several ERISA class actions. In that brief,
20151
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As further evidence of their desirability, proponents point out that pen-
sion funds themselves often solicit portfolio-monitoring services 29 and
other third parties recommend the practice. For instance, in a 2004 study,
PriceWaterhouseCoopers observed that public pension funds are playing
a greater role in securities litigation and that these funds "benefit from
free portfolio monitoring services offered by plaintiffs' firms to pension
funds and other institutional investors. '30 In 2006, the Government Fi-
nance Officers Association, a professional association of state and local
government-finance officers, issued a "Best Practice" guide for public
pensions participating in securities class actions, which affirmatively rec-
ommended that public pensions "develop clear, written procedures for
monitoring class action litigation and settlements. '31
III. THE TREATMENT OF PORTFOLIO MONITORING
IN THE COURTS
Although the courts initially recognized the value of portfolio-monitor-
ing agreements, they have more recently raised the concern that some of
these arrangements might spur lawyer-driven frivolous securities litiga-
tion. In Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Systems,
the Secretary stated, "Not only is a fiduciary not prohibited from serving as a lead plaintiff,
the Secretary believes that a fiduciary has an affirmative duty to determine whether it
would be in the interest of the plan participants to do so. The Secretary has previously
taken the position that it may not only be prudent to initiate litigation, but also a breach of
a fiduciary's duty to not pursue a valid claim." Peg O'Hara, The Role of Pension Plans in
Corporate Governance, SE 40 ALI-ABA 11, 73 (Sept. 30, 1999). As a result of the Secre-
tary's views, pension funds across the nation began developing and implementing portfo-
lio-monitoring systems as essential components of their efforts to exercise their fiduciary
duties. See Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund's Submission in Public Emps.' Retire-
ment Sys. of Miss. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 1:09-cv-01392, 2009 WL 1633177 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 8, 2009). Other sources have likewise recognized that institutional investors may have
a fiduciary obligation to consider whether legal recourse is necessary. See, e.g., James D.
Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence
and Legal Implications of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Set-
tlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 440 (2005) (stating that institution's beneficiaries may be
able to state a claim against the institutional investor for failing to file "all cost-justified
claims in securities fraud class action settlements"); Jeffrey Haas, When the Endowment
Tanks: Some Lessons for Nonprofits, Bus. L. TODAY 19 (June 2003) ("[T]he duty of care
requires boards to make reasonable inquiries whenever circumstances warrant .... At a
minimum, those whose endowments have declined must determine whether the declines
occurred unnecessarily as a result of others' misdeeds.").
29. A quick internet search yields dozens of these RFPs. See, e.g., ILLINOIS STATE
UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Securities Litigation Counsel RFP, http://
www.surs.org/news-article/070813/securities-litigation-counsel-rfp; SAN FRANCISCO EM-
PLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Investments, http://mysfers.org/about-sfers/investments/;
GENERAL TREASURER OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, Portfolio Monitoring and Securi-
ties Fraud Litigation Services, http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/dcce?date=20130415
&module=2&category=rfps&class=3&type=rfp&id=2897595.
30. Steven Skalak & Daniel Dooley, Securities Litigation Update - The Pension Fund
Factor, PriceWaterHouseCoopers (2004).
31. Government Finance Officers Association, Best Practice: Developing a Policy to




Inc.,32 the court held that a pension fund's monitoring agreement with a
plaintiffs' firm did not render the fund an inadequate class representative.
There, the defendant argued that the court should disqualify a pension
fund from the lead spot because the fund served as a lead plaintiff in
three other cases at counsel's request. The court, however, said that
"nothing" about the pension fund's relationship with counsel rendered it
inadequate. To the contrary, the court favored the fact that the pension
fund enjoyed an "ongoing relationship" with counsel to "monitor its in-
vestment portfolio for fraud."' 33 Similarly, in In re Cooper Co., Securities
Litigation, the court concluded that portfolio monitoring raised the infer-
ence that the institution would be an adequate representative because the
arrangement shows that the institution is actively involved in and aware
of the issues in the case.34
In Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund v. Credit-Based Asset Ser-
vicing & Securitization, LLC,35 however, the court critically scrutinized
portfolio-monitoring arrangements. These arrangements, the court wrote,
were "far beyond any traditional contingency arrangement" and instead
created a "clear incentive" to discover "fraud" and recommend suit.36
The court cautioned that these agreements "foster[ ] the very tendencies
toward lawyer-driver litigation that the PSLRA was designed to
curtail. ,37
Other courts began to recognize the concerns raised in Iron Workers.38
32. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C 01-20418,
2004 WL 5326262 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2004).
33. Id.; see also In re Am. Italian Pasta Co. Sec. Litig., No. 05-0725, 2007 WL 927745,
at *5 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 26, 2007) (stating that a portfolio-monitoring arrangement was "not
a problem," raised "nothing alarming," and, in fact, made sense for an institution with
"extensive investments" to take steps to be aware of prospective litigation affecting those
investments).
34. In re Cooper Co., Sec. Litig., 254 F.R.D. 628 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also In re Ne-
opharm, Inc., Sec. Litig., 225 F.R.D. 563, 567-68 (N.D. I11. 2004) (appointing institution as
lead plaintiff because ongoing monitoring services by counsel "illustrate[d] involvement in
and awareness of the financial affairs at issue").
35. 616 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
36. Id. at 464.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., In re Morgan Stanley Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Litig., No. 09-
CV-012137, 2013 WL 4778157, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2013) (acknowledging "key con-
cerns" in Iron Workers); In re Diamond Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., 295 F.R.D. 240, 255 (N.D.
Cal. 2013) (echoing the concerns raised in Iron Workers); City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.' Ret.
Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 844 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (same); Local
703 I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 282 F.R.D. 607,
615-16 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (stating that portfolio monitoring is "not without question"); In re
Wash. Mut., Inc. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., No. 2:08-MD-1919, 2010 WL 4272567,
at *8 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 2010) (stating that the firm's "tactics in recruiting... strike the
Court as unseemly"); In re Gen. Elec. Sec. Litig., No. 09-Civ. 1951, 2009 WL 2259502, at *6
n.4 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009) (stating that portfolio monitoring gives the judge "some
pause"). After Iron Workers, however, other courts still recognized the value attendant
with monitoring agreements. See, e.g., Berg v. Guthart, No. 5:14-cv-00515, 2014 WL
3749780, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2014); Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund v.
Burns, 292 F.R.D. 515, 523-24 (N.D. Ohio 2013); City of Livonia Emps.' Retirement Sys. v.
Wyeth, 284 F.R.D. 173, 179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); United Food & Commercial Workers
Union v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 281 F.R.D. 641, 655 (W.D. Okla. 2012); In re Ut-
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In In re Kosmos Energy Ltd. Securities Litigation, for example, the court,
relying on Iron Workers, held that a pension fund's monitoring agree-
ment with a plaintiffs' firm that did not allow for competition called the
fund's adequacy "into serious question. '39 The court concluded, for sev-
eral reasons, that the fund was unfit to lead the class. 40 In that case, a
pension fund sought to represent the class against a company for alleg-
edly issuing a misleading registration statement in connection with a pub-
lic offering of stock. The court emphasized that the fund's monitoring
arrangement with the plaintiffs' firm was exclusive, meaning that the law
firm would be guaranteed to represent the institution if a suit was identi-
fied. This "exclusivity," the court said, made the potential for a conflict
"even more significant."'41 The court held that the monitoring arrange-
ment, coupled with the fund's chair's "dismaying lack of knowledge and
understanding regarding crucial matters," rendered the fund inadequate
to lead the class.42
As these recent cases suggest, a court may perceive monitoring ar-
rangements as attempts by lawyers to initiate and litigate frivolous cases
to recover their own fees rather than benefit the investors they
represent. 43
IV. BEST PRACTICES FOR PORTFOLIO MONITORING: NON-
EXCLUSIVITY AND INDEPENDENCE
To honor Professor Bromberg's commitment to striking the proper bal-
ance between providing effective remedies to victims of securities fraud
while deterring frivolous litigation, the courts should support those par-
ticular portfolio-monitoring arrangements that will not impair the institu-
tion's ability to typically and adequately represent the class. In short,
these arrangements should not be exclusive and should retain the institu-
tion's independence, features that obviate the risk that firms will advance
frivolous lawsuits.
A. PORTFOLIO-MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD
NOT BE EXCLUSIVE
Ensuring that the fund may use several firms to monitor its investments
mitigates the risk that a firm will recommend a frivolous suit.44 If multiple
firms monitor an institution's holdings but only a single firm recommends
starcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 04-04908, 2010 WL 1945737, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2010);
Silversman v. Motorola, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 163, 173 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
39. 2014 WL 1095326, at *13.
40. Id. at *13.
41. Id.
42. Id. at *13-14; see also Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund v. Credit-Based
Asset Servicing & Securitization, LLC, 616 F. Supp. 2d 461, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
43. See, e.g., Iron Workers, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
44. Even still, the prospect that plaintiffs' lawyers will recommend meritless suits is
already addressed by the PSLRA with several safeguards. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (prohibiting a person to be lead plaintiff in more than 5 securities class ac-
tions); § 78u-4(a)(2) (requiring the lead plaintiff to certify that the plaintiff has reviewed
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suing, then that recommendation is more likely to be suspect by the insti-
tution. But if a firm's initial recommendation is corroborated by other
firms, then this lends credibility to the recommendation. 45 The institution
can play law firms against each other to pressure-test advice or negotiate
the best terms for the institutional investor.
Many public pensions already require this competitive process. For in-
stance, the Illinois State Universities Retirement System provides that
when a firm identifies a potential claim, the fund, which will retain three
to five firms, will "match [its] portfolios against reports of securities litiga-
tion cases obtained from Consultants, law firms engaged for securities
litigation, and from other sources deemed reliable by Staff ....,46
In the context of selecting lead plaintiffs, courts view the presence of
such competition favorably.47 For instance, in Iron Workers, the court re-
fused to appoint a labor fund over a state fund in part because the labor
fund obtained advice on the lawsuit from a single firm whereas the state
fund had monitoring arrangements with a dozen firms, none of whom
were guaranteed to be hired if litigation followed.48 Similarly, in City of
Pontiac General Motors Employees' Retirement System v. Lockheed Mar-
tin, the court appointed a pension fund to serve as lead plaintiff and ob-
served with approval that the fund used three separate firms to monitor
its investments. 49
Competition among plaintiffs' firms not only mitigates the risk that
plaintiffs' lawyers will "discover" fraud, it also encourages firms to offer
an institution the best deal on attorneys' fees. There is empirical evidence
that competition and active participation among repeat players at this liti-
gation stage actually reduces the amount of securities class action attor-
and authorized the complaint, did not buy company shares at counsel's direction, and that
the plaintiff is willing to lead the class).
45. Cf Lead Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion for
Class Certification, No. 1:10-cv-06016 (May 20, 2013), 2013 WL 7165821, at *9 n.21 (citing
testimony of pension fund that it retained another law firm in securities litigation because
"it is a $5 billion pension fund, so ... it just makes sense to have another set of eyes
looking at it").
46. ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Securities Litigation Counsel
RFP, http://www.surs.org/pdfs/RFP/invest/sec-litigation/Securities-Litigation-Counsel-
RFP-Ex-A.pdf; see also IOWA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Request for
Proposal Number 2006-L-001 for Securities Litigation Consultant Services, at 2 (Aug. 16,
2006), http://www.ipers.org/publications/rfps/pdf/awarded/2006securitieslitigationcounsel.
pdf ("IPERS may also request advice from any or all members of the pool retained here-
under about any securities litigation matter before making a decision as to whether to
retain counsel or which counsel to retain.").
47. See In re Diamond Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., 295 F.R.D. 240, 255 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(appointing institution as lead plaintiff where institution "retained thirteen law firms to
monitor" the institution's investments); In re Gen. Elec., No. 09 Civ. 1951, 2009 WL
2259502, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009) (recognizing that if an institution is "monitored by
more than one law firm," this would mitigate any potential conflict).
48. Iron Workers, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
49. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 844 F. Supp. 2d
498, 502-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
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ney's fees.50 Institutions with multiple monitoring agreements can force
law firms to compete on price. 51 In fact, some law firms openly recom-
mend that institutional investors use multiple firms to monitor their
investments.52
Additionally, competition may increase the quality of the attorneys'
prefiling investigation. The prefiling period is a critical period for securi-
ties-fraud plaintiffs. 53 If a plaintiffs' firm knows that it will be pitching its
case for representation alongside several other firms, that firm should be
less motivated to simply free-ride on others' efforts, and more motivated
to conduct a thorough prefiling investigation, uncover additional, reliable
evidence of the fraud, and piece together facts under a compelling legal
theory.
B. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS SHOULD RETAIN INDEPENDENCE WHEN
DECIDING WHETHER TO SUE AND WHICH LAW FIRM TO RETAIN
Ensuring that the institution independently determines whether to sue,
and which firm to retain if it does, mitigates any concern that the plain-
tiffs' firm is driving the litigation or recommending a frivolous case. An
independent decision to litigate or not demonstrates that the institution is
actively involved in and aware of the issues in the case, and that it is not
just the plaintiffs' firm picking the institution's stock and filing suit. More-
over, the institution's use of lawyers or other skilled intermediaries when
independently deciding whether to sue provides an additional check on
the possibility that plaintiffs' lawyers are recommending frivolous litiga-
tion. In fact, many public pension funds already require this level of
independence. 54
Where the institution retains that independence, courts properly take a
positive view of portfolio-monitoring arrangements. 55 For example, in
50. Michael A. Perino, Markets and Monitors: The Impact of Competition and Experi-
ence on Attorneys' Fees in Securities Class Actions, (St. John's Legal Studies, Research
Paper No. 06-0034, 2006) (finding support for the hypothesis that competition and active
participation of repeat players lower securities class action fees).
51. See David H. Webber, The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securities Class Ac-
tions, 106 Nw. L. REV. 157, 167 (2012).
52. See, e.g., Berman Devalerio, supra note 26; MOTLEY RICE, supra note 20.
53. See, e.g., John M. Wunderlich, The Importance of the Prefiling Phase for Securities-
Fraud Litigation, 45 Loy. U. CHICAGO L.J. 739, 766-68 (2014).
54. See, e.g., STATE OF WISCONSIN INVESTMENT BOARD, Securities Litigation Class
Action Procedures, http://www.swib.state.wi.us/Litigation.aspx (requiring the Board's com-
mittee and chief legal counsel to independently review and recommend initiating, joining,
appearing in, or submitting a filing in any public-market corporate-fraud litigation); The
Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System Securities Monitoring & Litigation Policy, at
2-3 (Sept. 2008), http://www.ipers.org/publications/misc/pdf/financial/investments/policies/
secmonlit.pdf (requiring the System's legal staff to present a "very strong" basis for suing
to the Board, which makes the ultimate determination, before initiating any litigation);
California State Teachers' Retirement System Corporate Governance Program Policies, at
3-5 (Apr. 2006), http://www.calstrs.com/Investments/CorpGovPolicies_200604.pdf (requir-
ing the board of directors to determine whether to seek lead plaintiff status based on an
internal evaluation and an independent assessment from outside counsel).
55. See, e.g., In re Kosmos Energy Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 3:12-cv-373, 2014 WL 1095326,
at *13 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2014) (refusing to appoint an institution as lead plaintiff where,
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Iron Workers, the court selected a state-pension fund 56 over a labor fund
to act as lead plaintiff, in part, because the state fund left the decision
whether to bring suit and the oversight of any litigation to the lawyers in
the State Attorney General's Office. 57 Further, the institution was free to
retain any counsel it wished; in fact, the firm retained by the state fund
was different from the firm that recommended suing in the first place. 58
Additionally, the one ethics watchdog to examine portfolio monitoring
found no inherent conflict of interest when the institution retains the abil-
ity to decide whether to sue and who to retain. The New York State Bar
Association's Committee on Professional Ethics evaluated whether an at-
torney, without compensation, could monitor a client's investments in or-
der to identify potential claims, even though the client may later consider
that attorney to handle, for compensation, any resulting litigation. 59 As-
suming that after litigation is identified, the institution is free to take no
action or hire another lawyer, the New York State Bar concluded that
nothing about the practice was forbidden by the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The ethics opinion stated that surely the lawyer would
benefit from recommending legal services, but an interest in being hired
is inherent in every attorney-client relationship.
among other problems, the monitoring agreement obligated the institution to retain the
monitoring firm); Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund v. Burns, 292 F.R.D. 515, 523
(N.D. Ohio 2013) (appointing institution as lead plaintiff and observing that the institution
"was under no obligation to retain" the monitoring firm); United Food & Commercial
Workers Union v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 281 F.R.D. 641, 649-50 (W.D. Okla. 2012)
(appointing institution as lead counsel and observing that monitoring services "did not
function as a retainer agreement or an agreement to initiate specific litigation, even litiga-
tion of those claims identified as a result of... monitoring"); City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.'
Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 844 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (ap-
pointing institution as lead plaintiff where portfolio-monitoring agreement allowed institu-
tion to retain other firms); In re Wash. Mut., Inc. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., No.
2:08-md-1919, 2010 WL 4272567, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 2010) (appointing institution
as lead plaintiff and observing that the institution's "board considered counsel's offer,
asked questions, and joined in the action freely by taking a vote"); Plumbers & Pipefitters
Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C 01-20418, 2004 WL 5326262, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. May 27, 2004) (observing that the institution "elected" to sue after the firm recom-
mended litigation).
56. See, e.g., STATE OF WISCONSIN INVESTMENT BOARD, Securities Litigation Class
Action Procedures, http://www.swib.state.wi.us/Litigation.aspx (requiring the Board's com-
mittee and chief legal counsel to independently review and recommend initiating, joining,
appearing in, or submitting a filing in any public-market corporate-fraud litigation); The
Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System Securities Monitoring & Litigation Policy, at
2-3 (Sept. 2008), http://www.ipers.org/publications/misc/pdf/financial/investments/policies/
secmonlit.pdf (requiring the System's legal staff to present a "very strong" basis for suing
to the Board, which makes the ultimate determination, before initiating any litigation);
California State Teachers' Retirement System Corporate Governance Program Policies, at
3-5 (Apr. 2006), http://www.calstrs.com/Investments/CorpGovPolicies-200604.pdf (requir-
ing the board of directors to determine whether to seek lead plaintiff status based on an
internal evaluation and an independent assessment from outside counsel).
57. Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund v. Credit-Based Asset Servicing &
Securitization, LLC, 616 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
58. Id.
59. New York State Bar Association, Committee on Professional Ethics, Ethics Opin-
ion 824 (July 2, 2008).
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V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have tried to strike a Brombergian balance by analyz-
ing how portfolio-monitoring agreements can best serve the investor-pro-
tection goals of the federal securities laws without burdening businesses
and the courts with frivolous litigation. That careful balance requires the
courts to endorse those agreements, but only if they are non-exclusive
and preserve institutional independence. While some may disagree with
how that balance has been struck, none can debate the overriding value
of trying to achieve that balance. Nor can anyone who cares about inves-
tor protection or the securities markets debate the wonderful legacy of
Alan Bromberg, a legacy that challenges us all to search for a delicate
balance.
